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The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity and Reconciliation Act
of 1996 preserve and, in certain respects, expanded the Medicaid entitlement for
families with children. By failing to restructure Medicaid, however, federal
lawmakers left intact the eligibility standards and enrollment procedures that
had been in use under the repealed Aid to Families with Dependent Children
program (AFDC). By failing to modernize Medicaid eligibility standards and
enrollment procedures to meet the demands of a new "work-instead-of-welfare"
environment that replaced the "welfare-to-work" paradigm that underlay
AFDC, lawmakers effectively assured a long-term decline in Medicaid coverage
for families with children. This decline is already well underway. Furthermore,
states have only begun the fundamental program restructuring necessary to the
preservation of Medicaid as a major and viable source of coverage for low
income workers and theirfamilies.
I. INTRODUCTION
As the White House and Congress completed negotiations over the final
welfare reform legislation1 early in August 1996, much of the health policy
community breathed a collective sigh of relief because negotiators rejected2
inclusion of provisions passed by both Houses that would have converted
Medicaid from an individual entitlement into a block grant.3 Moreover, in order
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Public Health and Health Services.
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1 See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
2 See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-725, pt. 46, at 291-92 (1996), reprinted in 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2649, 2679-80 (requiring states to provide "Medicaid to all persons who would
be eligible for AFDC cash benefits").
3 See, e.g., id.; HOUsE COMM. ON COMMECE, HR. REP. No. 104-651, at 323-74 (1996),
reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2235, 2235-87; CoMM. ON COMMERCE, MiNoRrry &
ADDnmONAL VIEWS, H.R. REP. No. 104-651, at 2018-22 (1996), reprinted in 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2235,2614-18. A block grant is a type of law that authorizes the expenditure of a
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to avert declines in Medicaid coverage as a result of the elimination of Aid to
Families with Dependent Children (ADC)4 the conferees agreed to require
states to continue to use their existing AFDC standards as the minimum basis of
Medicaid coverage.5 Thus, while the successor Temporary Assistance for Needy
Families (TANF) block grant vested states with almost unfettered latitude over
cash welfare payment policy, Medicaid appeared to be "saved."
What most health policy analysts did not understand-and came into clearer
view only well after the enactment of welfare refom--was the major impact that
the repeal of AFDC would have on Medicaid. Indeed, the effects of the changes
became apparent only as the Medicaid program and federal census data began to
show sharp declines in the number of beneficiaries.6
The failure of health policymakers to grasp the vast implications of welfare
restructuring for Medicaid (even if the individual entitlement was saved) is not
hard to understand. The root of the problem lies in the intricate structural and
methodological relationship which Medicaid and cash welfare historically have
maintained and the extreme difficulties that arise in any effort to disentangle
Medicaid and welfare. In much of the health policy debate that surrounds
Medicaid, these rules essentially remain out of view, since most of the analysis
available on Medicaid concerns coverage and expenditure patterns for enrollees
and "recipients."7 Exactly how a person comes to be a "recipient" is a focus for
defined amount of finding by a unit of state or local government. A block grant creates no
individual entitlement to benefits on the part of persons served by programs funded through the
block grant. See generally Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat 2105 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.) (providing an example of block grant legislation in the Temporary Assistance to Needy
Families (TANF), which replaced the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)
program in 1996). Had Congress converted Medicaid into a block grant, the beneficiaries
would have lost their federal entitlement to health coverage.
4 See Social Security Act of 1935, ch. 531, tit. IV §§ 401-03, 49 Stat 620, 627-29,
repealed by Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193,
110 Stat. 2105.
5 See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(I) (1994).
6 See U.S. CENsus BUREAu, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, P60-208, HEALTH INSURANCE
COVERAGE 1 (1998) (reporting "the number of uninsured children was 11.1 million in 1998 or
15A percent of all children"). The most notable increase in the number of uninsured children
occurred among children under age six; the proportion of uninsured children in this age group
rose from 20.1% to 23.6%. See Robert Pear, Number ofAmericans Who Were Uninsured Rose
in 1998, U.S. Says, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 4, 1999, at A-1. The youngest children (infants and
children under age six) are the most likely to be eligible for Medicaid. See PAUL FRONSTIN,
EMPLOYEE BENEFITS RESEARCH INSIT-uTE, SOURCEs OF HEALTH INSURANCE AND
CHARACIER cs OF THE UNwsuRED 23 thl.12 (1998). In 1997,27% and 25.4% of infants and
children ages one through six, respectively, received Medicaid, compared to 20.5% of all
children under age 18. See id.
7 See, e.g., FRONSTN, supra note 6, at 23; DIANE ROWLAND Er AL., A REPORT OF THE
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only a handful of health services researchers, typically individuals with welfare
law and policy backgrounds. Thus, the evidence suggests that neither the
Congressional Budget Office (which estimated that only nominal Medicaid
caseload changes would occur as a result of welfare reform) 8 nor White House
and Congressional negotiators saw what was coming.
Medicaid is an essential part of the nation's health care financing system. In
calendar year 1990, the program accounted for 11.3% of total personal health care
expenditures. 9 A major source of funding for both primary and acute health
services as well as long term care, Medicaid is particularly important for families
with children. In 1996, the program covered twenty-five percent of all infants and
young children l0 and ten percent of all women ages eighteen to sixty-four.'1 In
light of the limited availability of employee health benefits for low income
workers and their families, the need for Medicaid is obvious.12
Medicaid's sheer size makes it an important source of healthcare financing.
Widespread erosion in Medicaid coverage would reverberate throughout the
American health care system, further jeopardizing the financial stability of health
care institutions and diminishing already limited access to health care among
uninsured Americans who in 1998 comprised 16.3% of the U.S. population.' 3
This Article examines the consequences of welfare reform for Medicaid. It
also assesses the restructuring in Medicaid that will be required if the program is
KAISER COMM'N ON THE FUTURE OF MEDICAID, MEDICAID AT THE CROSSROADS 5-12 (1992)
(discussing the cost of Medicaid and who is eligible to receive aid); DAVID LISKA Er AL.,
STATE-LEVEL DATABOOK ON HEALTH CARE ACCESS AND FINANCING 131-54 (3d ed. 1998)
(providing data on various aspects of each state's Medicaid program, including eligibility,
enrollment, participation, and expenditures).
8 See Letter from June O'Neill, Director, Cong. Budget Office, to Jacob 3. Lew, Acting
Director, Office of Mgmt. & Budget 6 (Aug. 9, 1996) (on file with authors) (estimating that
"[i]n general the bill retains categorical eligibility for Medicaid families that meet the eligibility
criteria for AFDC as they are in current law.... Overall the CBO judge[d] that there would be
no significant budgetary effect of the [TANF] block grant on the Medicaid program.").
9 See CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV., MEDICAID SOURCE BOOK: BACKGROUND DATA
AND ANALYSIS (A 1993 UPDATE) 2 (1993) [hereinafter MEDICAID SOURCE BOOK].
10 See ALINA SALGANICOFF ET AL., CHILD HEALTH FACrs: NATIONAL AND STATE
PROFILES OF COVERAGE 13 fig.2 (1998).
1 1 See THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, HEALTH CONCERNS ACROSS A WOMAN'S LIFESPAN:
1998 SURVEY OF WOMEN'S HEALTH 33 (1999).
1 2 See ELLEN O'BRiEN & JUDITH FEDER, HENRY J. KAISER COMM'N ON MEDICAID & THE
UNINSURED, EMPLOYMENT-BASED HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE AND ITS DECLINE: THE
GRO\vING PLIGHT OF Low WAGE WORKERS 4 (1999). In 1993, only 36% of workers earning
less than $5.00 (the minimum wage) worked in firms that sponsored a health plan, compared to
92% of workers eaming $15 per hour or more. See id. at 4 figA. In 1993, only 27% of all
workers in the lowest wage quintile had employer coverage. See id at 8 tbl.3.
13 See Pear, supra note 6, at A-1.
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to be a viable source of coverage for low income families with children. This
Article considers the two distinct problems that the enactment of welfare reform
created for Medicaid. The first was an exacerbation of a serious, but relatively
well-known "back end" phenomenon, which occurs when people who leave
welfare also are terminated from Medicaid, even though they continue to qualify
for coverage. This problem is as old as Medicaid itself; it emanates from
Medicaid's welfare "piggyback" structure, which makes it vulnerable to improper
cessation when welfare payments cease. 14 To the extent that the 1996 legislation
intensified the cessation of benefits, this back end problem appears to have
deepened.15
The second problem, which is more difficult to measure or analyze, is a
"front end" phenomenon that appears to have developed throughout the country.
This front end problem can be summed up as either the failure to enroll in
Medicaid at all or a delay in enrollment until serious health needs are present
Failed and delayed enrollment patterns have numerous repercussions. The most
obvious is a loss of any coverage among low income children and parents. A
somewhat less obvious, but equally serious consequence, could be a decline in the
proportion of healthy enrollees and a concomitant increase in the proportion of
enrollees with health problems if low income working families fail to enroll at all
or else delay enrollment until a family member is ill. If such an enrollment pattern
emerges, it could spell the end for approaches to coverage such as risk-based
managed care arrangements, which, like any insurance system, depend for their
stability depends on a large pool of healthy members.
Because of its long term implications, it is the front end dilemma that may be
of greatest concern.16 Some individuals ascribe this front end problem either to a
failure on the part of eligible families to understand their ability to qualify for
Medicaid or an unwillingness to apply.17 However, the erosion in Medicaid is a
deep structural problem that cannot be dismissed simply as family ignorance or
14 See generally Sara Rosenbaum, Summary Termination of Medical Benefits to Aged
Blind and Disabled Persons: Perils of a Piggyback Entitlement Program, 2 CLEARINGHOUSE
REV. 404 (1978) (providing an overview of the long-standing nature of this problem).
15 See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICAID ENROLUMENT: AMID DECLINES, STATE
EFFORTS TO ENSURE COVERAGE AFTER WELFARE REFORM VARY 24 (1999). This 1999 report
on welfare's effects on Medicaid enrollment found that in the states selected for study, the
percentage of families who continued to be enrolled in Medicaid during the 12-month welfare
to work transition was as low as 4%. See id
16 See, e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICAID: EARLY IMPICATIONS OF
WELFARE REFORM FOR BENEFICIARIES AND STATES 19 (1998) (expressing concern over the
number of eligible children and families who did not enroll in Medicaid) [hereinafter
MEDICAID: EARLY IMPLICATIONS]; Shailagh Murray, Drop in Food-Stamp Rolls is Mysterious
and Worrisome, WALL ST. J., Aug. 2, 1999, at A-20 (discussing a report by the General
Accounting Office showing a decrease in food stamp use due to poor public information).
17 See MEDICAID: EARLY IMPLICATIONS, supra note 16, at 19.
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resistance to enrollment; indeed, evidence suggests that Medicaid expansions
aimed at pregnant women and low income families with children have been met
with great enthusiasm among eligible families. 18
The erosion in Medicaid coverage can be understood only as a structural
phenomenon that related to lawmakers' decision to use AFDC criteria to
determine Medicaid eligibility. Two separate sets of consequences, one
substantive and one procedural, flowed from this decision. As this Article will
show, in preserving Medicaid's substantive ties to the repealed AFDC program,
lawmakers effectively dictated that eligibility be considered in accordance with
standards intended for use in a program designed to reach a nonworking
population. States would effectively have to administer two separate welfare
systems: one for cash welfare and one for Medicaid. Rather than redesigning the
program to meet the practical needs of persons who work instead of receiving
welfare, Congress essentially chose to continue the program as an add-on benefit
for nonworkers (i.e., AFDC beneficiaries), even as the ability to secure assistance
without working was disappearing. This Article will further underscore that while
Congress included in the 1996 legislation state options to reconfigure their
Medicaid programs to better meet the needs of low income workers, these
changes were optional. By 1998, almost no states had pursued them. 19 Thus, as
welfare reform altered the essential nature of welfare, welfare offices, and the
welfare application process, Congress effectively left the Medicaid program
behind.
To the extent that Medicaid policy and procedures remain wedded to
outdated welfare theory, its long term stability remains in doubt; indeed, the
decision on the part of lawmakers to "freeze frame" Medicaid by preserving
eligibility based on defunct AFDC standards threatens to "end Medicaid as we
know it." A fundamental overhaul of Medicaid eligibility standards and
enrollment procedures is necessary to preserve the program as a viable source of
coverage for families with children.
Part II begins with a brief overview of Medicaid coverage for families with
children and reviews the structure of the program during the 1965-1996 time
period. Part LIT discusses the 1996 welfare reform legislation and the Medicaid
amendments that accompanied it This Part considers both the basic Medicaid
eligibility rules adopted under the welfare reform legislation, as well as the
provisions that allowed-but did not require-states to make the necessary
changes in Medicaid to conform the program to the realities of the new welfare
environment. Part IV examines diversion, the heart of the new welfare system, as
well as the extent to which state Medicaid agencies, using the 1996 legislative
18 See generally U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE PRENATAL CARE: EARLY SUCCESS IN
ENROLLING WOMEN MADEELIGMLE BY MEDICAID EXPANSIONS (1991).
19 See infra note 50 and accompanying text
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options made available to them, have responded to this shifting welfare structure.
The Article concludes in Part V with an assessment of the Medicaid restructuring
that will be needed if the program is to survive in the new welfare system as an
insurer of working families with children.
H. MEDICAiD COVERAGE FOR FAMIuES wrm CHILDREN (1965-1996)
Medicaid2° is a federal grant-in-aid program that entitles individuals who
satisfy its eligibility requirements to "medical assistance" coverage for a wide
range of medical care items and services.21 States administer Medicaid under
broad federal standards relating to eligibility, benefits, provider participation and
payment, and administration to receive a federal contribution. In 1999-2000, the
federal contribution toward states' medical assistance expenditures ranged from
fifty to eighty-three percent of total state medical assistance outlays.22 Medicaid is
an open-ended entitlement to states, without an upper limit on total federal
contributions, either on an aggregate or per-capita basis. However, states place
limits on their Medicaid expenditures that are in accord with their own budget
constraints.
Both the largest and most complex of all federal means-tested public
assistance programs, Medicaid is a central part of the American health care
financing system. In Fiscal Year 1995, Medicaid enrolled over thirty-six million
nonelderly children and adults-nearly sixteen percent of the U.S. population.2 3
Total state and federal Medicaid expenditures that year exceeded $133 billion.24
A complete discussion of Medicaid is beyond the scope of this Article.25
However, it is important to understand its basic structure in order to appreciate the
effects of the 1996 law. From the time of its original enactment in 1965, Medicaid
has effectively functioned as three distinct programs. First, Medicaid provides
coverage for certain impoverished families with children, low income pregnant
women, and low income children under age nineteen. The program specifically
extends twelve months of transitional coverage for persons needing AFDC for
three out of six months prior to losing cash assistance as a result of increased
20 See Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1994 & Supp. 1111997).
21 See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10) (1994).
22 Medicare & Medicaid Guide (CCH) 14,905, at 6471 (1999).
23 See DAvID LiSKA Er AL., supra note 7, at 138 tbl.D-1 (referring to the Medicaid
eligibility enrollment and program participation of the nonelderly from 1994 to 1995).
24 See id at 144 tbl.D-5 (referring to the Medicaid enrollees expenditures and expenditures
per enrollee by enrollment group).
25 See generally MEDICAID SoURCE BOOK, supra note 9 (providing perhaps one of the
best overall discussion of Medicaid).
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earnings.2 6 Second, the program covers children and adults with disabilities who
receive Supplemental Security Income (SSI); 2 7 the program also extends
coverage to certain disabled workers who no longer qualify for SSI.28 In this
capacity, Medicaid not only assures coverage for children and adults who might
otherwise be excluded from health insurance plans because of a disability, but
also pays for long term care in both institutional and community settings, which
typically is not covered by private health insurance 29
Third, Medicaid acts as a companion insurance program to Medicare by
paying Medicare's premiums, deductibles, and copayments for eligible low
income Medicare beneficiaries.30 For the poorest beneficiaries (those who receive
SSI benefits for elderly or disabled persons), Medicaid provides full supplemental
coverage for services and benefits such as prescribed drugs and long term care
that are not covered by Medicare.31
This description of Medicaid is a vast over-simplification. Medicaid's
extraordinary complexity arises from the fact that rather than covering all low
income persons, the program covers more than fifty distinct categories of low
income and medically impoverished individuals and families. Each separate
category can best be understood as a response to some form of "market failure"
(the failure or unwillingness of the insurance industry to offer an affordable health
care product).32 As with many U.S. laws that compensate for market lapses, the
Medicaid statute operates like a series of legislative incisions rather than in a
broadly remedial fashion, providing relief only to the extent deemed necessary to
compensate for a particular cost or coverage deficiency in the private market.
In terms of its detailed eligibility structure, Medicaid traditionally has been
first and foremost a companion to cash welfare benefits. With certain limited
exceptions that are not relevant to this Article,33 children and adults who received
financial aid under either of the two principal federal cash welfare programs
26 See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(aX1OXAXi)(1),(II), ,(VI),(VII) (1994).
2 7 See 42 U.S.C. § 1382 (1994). The SSI program is a federally administered cash welfare
program that provides financial assistance to individuals who meet federal criteria related to
age, disability, and blindness and who also satisfy federal financial eligibility standards. See id.
28 See Social Security Act § 1905(q), 42 U.S.C. § 1395(q) (1994).
2 9 See generally RAND RosENBLATr ET AL., LAW AND THE AMERICAN HEALTH CARE
SYSTEM (1997 & 1999-2000 Supp.) (providing a general discussion of the differences between
Medicaid and private insurance).
30 See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(10)(A)(i)(1).
31 See id
32 See RosENBLATr Er AL., supra note 29, at 410-66 (providing a discussion of Medicaid
as a response to market failure).
33 See Medicare & Medicaid Guide (CCH) IN 14303-14381, at 5981-6230 (1999) (giving
a complete overview of current Medicaid eligibility standards).
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(AFDC3 4 and SSP 5) were automatically entitled to Medicaid. In 1995, more than
fifty-six percent of all Medicaid beneficiaries also received some form of
federally assisted cash welfare.36 Because of this tie to cash benefits, Medicaid
historically was highly dependent on, and sensitive to, the underlying dynamics of
the welfare system. Even as Medicaid coverage was liberalized over the years to
cover additional groups of low income children and adults (including all children
and pregnant women with income at or near the federal poverty level)37 and
welfare recipients in the process of transitioning to work,38 its links to welfare
were maintained. These links were particularly evident in the application system
as well as the standards and methodologies by which applicants' income and
resources were evaluated and financial eligibility was determined.
Thus, even as Medicaid coverage was extended to children and adults
ineligible for AFDC (either because of a lack of categorical ties to welfare or
excess earnings), Congress nonetheless preserved the link to welfare for the new
coverage groups by requiring states to apply the same methodologies used to
evaluate income and resources under the AFDC program.39 Despite widespread
popular perception that the Medicaid expansions for children, pregnant women,
and welfare-to-work families "broke the link" between AFDC and Medicaid, this
perception was only partially correct. It is true that these coverage expansions
broadened the categories of persons eligible for Medicaid and raised the income
and resource standards against which applicants' eligibility would be measured 4
3 4 See Social Security Act, ch. 531, tit. IV §§ 401-03,49 Stat. 620, 627-29, repealed by
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
193, 110 Stat. 2105.
35 See 42 U.S.C. § 1381 (1994).
36 See HENRY J. KAISER COMM'N ON THE FUTURE OF MEDICAr, MEDICAID
EXPENDrrUREs AND BENEFICARiEs, NATIONAL AND STATE PROFILEs AND TRENDS, 1990-1995,
at 9 fig.2 (3d ed. 1998).
3 7 See infra note 40 and accompanying text.
3 8 See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
39 See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17)(B) (1994).
4 0 In 1996, the average AFDC standard for a family with no other income stood at 34% of
the federal poverty level. See U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS,
105TH CONG., 1998 GREEN BOOK 416-17 tbls.7-8 (Comm. Print 1998). By setting the income
eligibility standard at 100% of the federal poverty level (and higher in the case of pregnant
women, infants, and children under age six), the reforms of the 1980s led to the expansion of
coverage for children and pregnant women. Between 1990 and 1995, the number of children
receiving Medicaid, but not cash assistance, increased by 17.6% annually on average. The
number of children receiving both Medicaid and cash grew by only 3.4% per year on average
during this time period. For a general discussion of the Medicaid reforms for women, children,
and former recipients of welfare, see Sara Rosenbaum, Medicaid Expansions and Access to
Health Care, in MEDICAID FINANCING CRIsis: BALANCING RESPONsIBILmES, PRIORTIES, AND
DOLLARS 45,45-81 (Diane Rowland et al. eds., 1993).
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At the same time, however, welfare methodologies were retained for income
evaluation purposes 4 1 Furthermore, as was the case for welfare recipients, state
welfare agencies continued to be designated as the entities that would determine
eligibility for Medicaid, even in the case of persons who were not eligible for
welfare and had no intention of applying for welfare.42
The importance of restructuring Medicaid to make it a more effective means
of covering poor working families is not a new concept. Medicaid amendments
enacted in 1988 gave states the option to adopt more liberal methodologies for
evaluating income in the case of low income children and pregnant women who
qualified for Medicaid on the basis of income alone.43 This amendment gave
states the flexibility to move decisively away from AFDC methodologies for
evaluating income in structuring their Medicaid eligibility standards-at least in
the case of children.
The need to move away from AFDC eligibility methodologies in calculating
Medicaid coverage becomes evident once the basic premise and structure of
AFDC is examined. AFDC was conceived in 1935 as a program that provided
subsistence to families with virtually no other income. Moreover, in calculating
"net income," applicants' earnings are counted almost in their entirety at the point
of application; the only earned income deduction available is a nominal $90
earned income disregard.44 This minimum deduction for applicant earned income
is sufficient if the underlying program concept is to aid only those people who do
not work.45 If the goal is to aid lower income workers, then the deduction is
totally inadequate, since even low wage earners make several hundred dollars per
month4 6
Once AFDC recipients enter the work force, the earnings disregard rises
somewhat, thereby allowing recipients to work and retain welfare and
41 Federal regulations require that in determining eligibility for Medicaid, states must
apply "the cash assistance financial methodologies and requirements of the cash assistance
program that is most closely categorically related to the individual's status." 42
C.F.1. § 435.601(a) (1998).
4 2 Section 1396(aX55) requires state Medicaid agencies, as a condition of receipt of
federal funds, to allow certain groups of individuals-including low income children and
pregnant women--to file applications at certain outstationed locations, including federally
qualified health centers and hospitals that serve a "disproportionate share' of low income and
Medicaid beneficiaries. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(aX55) (1994). No study has ever quantified the
proportion of all beneficiaries who enroll in outstationed locations, but a study of outstationing
suggests only limited implementation of the requirement.
43 See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(rX2), amended by Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act of
1988 § 1396a(r)(2), Pub. L. No. 100-360, 102 Stat. 963 (1988).
44 See 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(aXii)(B) (1998).
45 See id
46 A minimum wage job at 40 hours per week would result in monthly gross
eamings of approximately $800.00.
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Medicaid.47 AFDC recipients who finally lose their welfare benefits because their
remaining earnings exceed allowable levels are entitled to receive extended
Medicaid coverage as long as they received AFDC in three out of the six months
preceding their loss of welfare.48
In sum, AFDC methodologies are calibrated to applicant families who
initially do not work and then gradually earn their way off welfare. Applying
AFDC methodologies to working families who effectively would disqualify most
poor workers at the point of application, since without application related
disregards, their earnings would exceed eligibility levels.49
The 1998 amendments thus permitted states to adopt more liberal
methodologies for the treatment of earned income, thereby allowing the program
to reach more children. In fact, however, few states responded to this option; as of
1998, only a handful of states had taken advantage of the flexibility offered by the
amendments. 0 This limited response was probably the result of several factors.
First, liberalizing eligibility standards adds program costs. States already incurred
additional costs in responding to the expanded coverage mandates for poor
children; few states could have been expected to go beyond the federal minimum
and serve additional children through a liberalized income test
Some of the failure to respond to the option may also be traceable to federal
administrative practices. The Health Care Financing Administration, the federal
agency which administers Medicaid, provided no guidance regarding the 1988
legislation.51 Furthermore, in many states, officials tend to have only a limited
knowledge of Medicaid eligibility. This is because as a matter of federal law, it is
welfare agencies, not Medicaid agencies, that oversee enrollment and make
eligibility determinations. 52 Medicaid agencies simply pay for the cost of the
eligibility determination process. While state Medicaid agencies possess expertise
47 The disregard for working welfare recipients amounts to $30 plus one-third of the
remaining earned income. See 45 C.F.R. § 233 (1998). This is commonly known as the "30 and
a third" disregard.
48 See 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-6(b)(1) (1994).
49 See infra Table 1.
50 A few states did expand coverage of children as part of larger demonstrations
conducted under section 1115 of the Social Security Act, which grants the Secretary broad
powers to permit states to extensively restructure their Medicaid programs. Section 1115
coverage expansions are typically accompanied by offsetting reductions in spending in other
areas of the program, as well as implementation of mandatory managed care. See SARA
ROSENBAUM Er AL., HENRY J. KAISER COMM'N ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED, SECTION
1115 MEDICAID WAIVERS: CHARTING A PATH FOR MEDICAID MANAGED CARE REFORM 184-86
(1999).
5 1 The only formal guidance can be found at State Medicaid Manual 3503, reprinted in
Supporting Families in Transitions: A Guide to Expanding Health Coverage in a Post-Welfare
Reform World, Medicare & Medicaid Guide (CCH) 14,521.27, at 5964.
52 See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(5) (1994).
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in the areas of benefit coverage, provider qualifications and compensation,
institutional quality oversight, and other matters related to the service aspect of
the program, Medicaid officials, as a group, tend to be relatively unfamiliar with
the operational issues of Medicaid eligibility. 53
Thus, experience with Medicaid leading up to the 1996 welfare reform
legislation suggested that most states did not take advantage of earlier options to
revise welfare standards and methodologies in order to open the program to
additional children in low income working families. The cost of exercising such
an option may have been an issue. An equally important factor may have been a
failure on the part of officials to understand either the significance of the
liberalized methodology options that Congress made available or the impact of
welfare methodologies on working applicants.
II. THE 1996 WELFARE REFORM LEGISLATION
A. Overview of the Act: State Authority to Change the Welfare Paradigm
The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of
1996 (PRWORA)54 was perhaps the most far-reaching welfare legislation since
the 1935 passage of the Social Security Act. The Act placed new restrictions on
SSI for children,55 child care,56 child nutrition, and food stamps57 and placed
major limitations on the eligibility of legal alien residents for Medicaid and other
forms of means-tested public assistance.58
The centerpiece of the PRWORA, however, was the repeal of AFDC and its
replacement with a successor program known as Temporary Assistance to Needy
5 3 See VERNON K. SMrH Er. AL., HENRY J. KAISER COMM'N ON MEDICADE &
UNINSURED, THE DYNAMICS OF CURRENT MEDICAID ENROLLMENT CHANGES: INSIGHTS FROM
FOCUS GRouPs OF STATE HUMAN SERVICES ADMINISTRATORS, MEDICAID ELIGIBILrrY
SPECIALISTS, AND WELFARE AGENCY ANALYSTS 13-15 (1998).
54 Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 42 U.S.C.).
55 Specifically, the Act modified provisions relating to the definition of disability among
children to restrict coverage for children with physical, mental, and developmental disabilities
and conditions. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1382 (1994)).
56 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-02 (Supp. 11997).
57 See Pub. L. No. 104-193 §§ 701-42,801-16, 110 Stat. 2287-2318 (1996).
58 See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 § 401,
Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105, 2261 (1996). For an overview of immigration law
changes and their implications for Medicaid, see SARA ROSENBAUM & JULIE DARNELL, KAISER
COMM'N ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED, AN ANALYSIS OF THE PERSONAL RESPONSIBILIY
AND WORK OPPORTUNiTY Acr OF 1996: IMPLICAIONS FOR MEDICAID AND HEALTH PROGRAMS
10-14(1997).
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Families (rANF). 59 Like AFDC, TANF entitles states to annual, aggregate
federal payments to support the provision of financial assistance to certain needy
families with children. Unlike AFDC, however, TANF does not create an
individual entitlement to cash assistance among eligible persons.60 Because
TANF is not an entitlement, states have the discretion to deny assistance even to
families that meet program eligibility requirements.
TANF gives states broad latitude over conditions of eligibility and enrollment
procedures and safeguards. Federal law does set certain outer limits on state
program design; these limits are designed mainly to ensure the imposition of
work requirements as a condition of eligibility,61 prohibition on aid to certain
categories of persons,62 and lifetime limits on the receipt of aid. 63 At their option,
states may adopt more stringent limits and may add conditions of eligibility.
In the context of this Article, states' ability to place conditions on the right to
apply for aid represents the single most important conceptual aspect of the 1996
legislation. Nothing in the 1996 law prevents a state from barring aid completely
or even from prohibiting individuals from filing applications for assistance. Thus,
while the authority (and indeed, the duty) to limit aid to a fixed period of time
garnered much of the attention paid to the legislation by the popular press, it was
this flexibility to prohibit entry into assistance at all that had far more long-lasting
effects. Indeed, it is this threshold right on the part of the states to halt entry into
welfare through the use of pre-application or pre-enrollment conditions that is
essential to moving away from the old construct of "welfare-to-work" and toward
the new paradigm of "work-instead-of-welfare."
A measure of the importance of this front end authority under the law is the
dramatic decline in welfare enrollment since enactment of the legislation.
Between 1996 and 1998, the number of individuals receiving cash assistance
declined by forty-one percent nationally, compared to a nine percent decline
between 1993 and 1996.64 A vibrant economy undoubtedly would have caused
welfare rolls to decline (a phenomenon that tends to occur during economic
recovery and growth cycles). But the phenomenal drop in assistance that occurred
in the years following welfare reform probably cannot be explained simply as the
result of a good economy or the back end loss of benefits. This type of drop can
be understood only as a consequence of states' authority to prevent new entrants
59 See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-193, 110 Stat 2105, 2210 (1996).
60 Seeid. § 103, 110 Stat. 2104,2113 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 601 (Supp. H 1997)).
61 See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 § 103,
Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105,2129 (1996) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 607 (Supp. I 1997)).
62 See id § 103, 110 stat 2105,2134-40 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 608(a) (Supp. 11997)).
63 See id. § 103, 110 Stat. 2105,2137-38 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 608(a) (Supp. 111997)).
64 See infra Table 1.
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from taking the place of exiting beneficiaries through the use of front end barrier
techniques known as "diversion," which is discussed in Part IV. Thus, although a
healthy economy could cause a downward movement in the welfare rolls
generally and back end limits could reduce the duration of welfare coverage,
neither approach by itself or in combination with the other could achieve the
overall reduction in enrollment that followed the enactment of the PRWORA.
B. The Medicaid Amendments in Welfare Reform
As noted, the conferees rejected legislative proposals to convert Medicaid
into a block grant 65 Furthermore, concerned over the effects of new and more
restrictive TANF eligibility standards on Medicaid, the conferees adopted
amendments that were intended to offset the possibility of declining Medicaid
coverage as a result of TANF. Under the amendments, states would be required to
continue to use their AFDC standards in effect on July 16, 1996 to determine
Medicaid coverage for AFDC-related families.66 This amendment which was
added at section 1931 of the Social Security Act, placed an eligibility floor under
the Medicaid program in order to prevent automatic Medicaid reductions simply
as a byproduct of possible welfare reductions and restrictions.
Beyond setting a Medicaid eligibility floor tied to 1996 AFDC standards,
section 1931 contained two Medicaid state plan options.67 First the law permitted
states to increase their AFDC-related income eligibility standards by an amount
equal to the percentage increase in the Consumer Price Index over the same time
period.68 Second, section 1931 created a methodology liberalization option
similar to the provision enacted in 1988 for poverty level children, and pregnant
women. This option allowed states to adopt "income and resource methodologies
that are less restrictive than the methodologies used under their State plan" as of
6 5 See supra note 3 and accompanying text
66 See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 § 114,
Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105, 2177-78 (1996) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396v-1 (Supp.
II 1997)). Section 1931 also allows states to roll back their AFDC standards to May 1, 1988
levels. See Social Security Act § 1931(bX2XA) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396u-l(b)(2)(A)
(1994)).
67 Section 1931 also permitted states to maintain the Medicaid eligibility criteria utilized
as part of an approved section 1115 welfare demonstration. Section 1115 demonstrations
cannot be undertaken simply as a state plan option. A state must apply for approval of a specific
demonstration, which must satisfy the Secretary's content and evaluation requirements. See
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 § 103, Pub. L. No.
104-193, 110 Stat. 2105,2157-58 (1996) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 615 (Supp. I 1997)).
68 See id § 103, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105, 2178 (1996) (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396v-l(bX2)(B) (Supp. I 1997)).
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July 16, 1996.69
This second provision was crucial: like the 1988 option, it allowed states not
merely to increase existing income standards, but to actually alter the
methodologies used to evaluate family income and resources in ways that would
result in greater eligibility for Medicaid, particularly in the case of working
families. Thus, as with the 1988 option, states could use their section 1931
authority to increase the size of the "earned income disregard" for working
applicant families, effectively making the entire family eligible for Medicaid. In
sum, section 1931, like the predecessor provision aimed at low income children,
permitted states to overcome the AFDC program's historic methodological
barriers to coverage of low income working families. The option would apply to
all categorically eligible family members (single working mothers and their
children and two-parent families meeting a state's unemployment test).70
Section 1931 can be viewed as an amplification of Congressional
expectations, first evidenced in 1988, that states would convert their Medicaid
programs to systems capable of aiding the working poor. However, the
amendment was only optional; states could elect to retain their 1996 AFDC
standards as an ongoing basis of eligibility for families with children. Crucially,
neither Congress, the White House, nor the Congressional Budget Office viewed
a state's decision to retain its AFDC standards as anything other than one to
maintain the status quo.71 No one imagined that such a decision ultimately might
be implicated in widespread declines in coverage. As it turned out, by retaining
AFDC as the basis of eligibility rather than moving to a new set of
"methodologies," Congress and the White House may have helped create the
barriers to Medicaid coverage that Congress sought to avoid through the
liberalization option provisions of the 1996 amendments.
As discussed in Part IV, the old AFDC standards and methods that are
designed to get aid to nonworkers created a Medicaid program that is at direct
odds with the new work-instead-of-welfare paradigm. When these two world
views-welfare-to-work and work-instead-of-welfare-met up in the welfare
reform implementation process, the results proved to be far-reaching and
unanticipated. Furthermore, although the means for overcoming this problem
existed (states could use section 1931 to move Medicaid off the old AFDC
paradigm and into conformity with the new welfare system), it was not until
1999--three years after the legislation-that the Health Care Financing
69 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 § 103, Pub.
L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105, 2178 (1996) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396v-l(b)(2)(C) (Supp.
I 1997)).70 Federal regulations defining unemployed families give states considerable flexibility to
use liberal tests of unemployment that result in the classification as unemployed of two-parent
families. See 45 C.F. Rt § 233.10 (1998).
71 See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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Administration, which administers the program, first issued extensive guidance
on the use of section 1931 to aid the working poor.
It is important to note that while section 1931 gave states the flexibility to
address the methodological problems created by retention of the AFDC formulas
that disfavor applicants with earnings, it did not alter the basic application system
for Medicaid. Left untouched by welfare reform were the provisions of the statute
that required eligibility determinations to be made by welfare agencies.
Furthermore, the requirement that states offer enrollment in certain "outstationed"
Medicaid application locations (application sites other than the local welfare
office)72 was not expanded. The law also did not alter states' practice of linking
welfare and Medicaid applications, even though in states whose TANF standards
departed from their 1996 AFDC eligibility criteria.
In short, beyond creating attractive options for expanding coverage, neither
Congress nor the Clinton Administration gave much if any consideration to the
ways73 in which a changing welfare paradigm could affect Medicaid benefits.
Neither Congress nor the Administration considered how a changing welfare
system would fundamentally alter the atmosphere or functioning of welfare
offices themselves, where Medicaid applications would continue to be filed and
considered.74
IV. STATE WELFARE DIVERSION PROGRAMS AND STATE MEDICAID
AGENCY RESPONSES: RESULTS OF A STUDY OF STATE DIVERSION
TECHNIQUES AND MEDICAID PROGRAM DESIGN CHOICES
A. An Overview ofDiversion
The new welfare paradigm of work-instead-of-welfare is achieved through
state diversion programs. As discussed, the old paradigm consisted of entry into
assistance, followed by job training and placement with a gradual shift into
work.75 Diversion entails never entering into formal and ongoing assistance
systems at all.
Diversion is a concept that is used to describe a variety of techniques for
deferring or delaying the receipt of welfare. The philosophical basis of diversion
is the belief that never entering welfare to begin with is the most important
technique for promoting selfsufficiency. Whether diversion achieves long term
72 See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
73 See infra Table 1 (sumn-araizing dynamics of Medicaid access prior to and
following the 1996 welfare reform amendments).
74 The changing dynamics of Medicaid access before and after welfare reform are
summarized infra in Table 2.
75 See supra notes 44-51 and accompanying text.
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selfsufficiency is unknown; what is evident however, is that the technique has a
powerful impact on initial enrollment
Unlike traditional welfare-to-work strategies that aim to help families make
the transition to work after their application for assistance is approved, or after
they have received benefits for a specified period of time, post-PRWORA
diversion programs aim to keep families from receiving (and even applying for)
welfare in the first place.76 By expanding the requirements that families must
meet in order to be eligible for assistance and providing more targeted assistance
to address their needs, diversion programs have the potential to dramatically alter
state approaches to providing assistance to poor families with children.
Beginning in 1997, the George Washington University School of Public
Health and Health Services undertook a multi-year study to understand diversion
and agency responses to diversion Medicaid. 7 For purposes of the study, we
broadly defined formal diversion program authorities explicitly designed to
address the immediate needs of families seeking cash assistance in ways that
avoid enrolling families into a state TANF program.78 We investigated the
prevalence of three types of diversion programs and activities that fit these
criteria: (1) lump sum payment schemes; (2) mandatory applicant job search
requirements; and (3) exploration of alternative resources. 9 States may employ
one, two, or all three approaches.
1. Types ofDiversion Programs
a. Lump Sum Payment Programs
Lump sum payment programs provide families with a one-time cash payment
in lieu of ongoing TANF assistance and are designed to keep families with a short
term financial need from ever entering the welfare system. These programs are
usually targeted to applicants who are already working or who have immediate
job prospects.80
7 6 See SARA ROsENBAuM Er AL., INITIAL FINDINGS FROM A NATIONWIDE STUDY OF
OUTSTATIONED MEDICAID ENROLLMENT PROGRAMS AT FEDERALLY QUALIFIED HEALTH
CENTERS 4-5 (1998) [hereinafter OUTSTATIONED MEDICAID ENROLLMENT PROGRAMS].
77 This study was supported by the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation and the United
States Department of Health and Human Services.
78 See OUTSTATIONED MEDICAID ENROLLMENT PROGRAMS, supra note 76, at 4.
79 See id at 11.
80 See infra Table 2 col.3 (totaling 20 states).
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b. Mandatory Applicant Job Search Programs
Mandatory applicant job search programs require applicants to conduct job
searches (ranging from several days to several weeks) before TANF benefits are
authorized. These programs are designed to serve two purposes: (1) to encourage
job-ready applicants to find employment quickly in an effort to reduce their need
for ongoing assistance; and (2) to send a clear message that program expectations
have changed. Applicants for assistance who fail to meet the job search
requirements have their applications for assistance denied. Some states also have
implemented voluntary applicant job search programs. 81 These programs may be
more narrowly targeted than mandatory programs. Most importantly, applicants
in voluntary programs who do not complete the job search requirements do not
have their applications for assistance denied.
c. Alternative Sources of Support Systems
Alternative sources of support systems are used by some states as means of
encouraging families to look elsewhere before submitting a TANF application 82
Exploration of alternative resources is intended to discourage families from
applying for cash assistance if other assistance is available to them and to help
them think more broadly about how they can draw upon resources in their
communities and families during times of need. Using this approach, states also
have attempted to respond more directly to families' specific needs rather than
encouraging them to apply for all benefits for which they might be eligible.
2. Nationwide Survey to Determine Prevalence ofDiversion
In the initial phase of our study, we conducted the first national survey to
determine the prevalence of diversion programs. 83 As of the summer of 1998,
thirty-one states had implemented at least one diversion program. Twenty states
were operating lump sum payment programs, with three additional states
planning to implement such programs by the end of 1998.84 Sixteen states
required TANF applicants to engage in active job searches before their
applications for assistance were approved.85 Seven states were using an
81 See i. at col.4 (totaling 16 states).
8 2 See id at col3 (totaling 7 states).
83 See OUTSrATIONED MEDICAID ENROLLMENT PROGRAMS, supra note 76, at 7-11.
84 See infra Table 3.
85 See id
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aggressive approach to help TANF applicants identify alternative resources.86
Most states operating formal diversion programs had implemented only one
program.87 Twelve states had implemented lump sum payment programs only
and ten states had implemented mandatory applicant job search requirements
only. Only three states had implemented all three forms of formal diversion.
In the second phase of our research, we conducted case studies of diversion
programs in five states. We found that the design and implementation of diversion
programs reflected state and local goals and philosophies, and that of the three
types of formal diversion, mandatory applicant job search represented the fastest
growing program with the greatest potential to divert large numbers of families.88
Findings also suggested that diversion has substantial potential to reduce initial
access to Medicaid, particularly as families increasingly bypass welfare altogether
or else go to work quickly.
3. Potential Effects ofDiversion on Access to and Eligibility for Medicaid
There are three primary ways in which diversion programs may affect
applicants' access to Medicaid. First, if applicants are not aware that their
eligibility for Medicaid is not linked to their eligibility for cash assistance, they
may not apply for Medicaid or complete their Medicaid applications because they
believe their applications for TANF will be denied. Second, because of the
historical link between eligibility for cash assistance and Medicaid, eligibility
workers, unless instructed to process applications for TANF and Medicaid
separately and carefully monitored, may deny an application for Medicaid based
on failure to comply with a TANF work requirement. They may also fail to
infonn applicants about alternative options for Medicaid coverage, especially in
the case of children who are eligible based on poverty alone as a result of the
eligibility expansions discussed in Part II. Third, by forcing more rapid work,
diversion programs may raise applicants' income above the AFDC-related
Medicaid eligibility threshold, making them ineligible for Medicaid assistance.89
For example, lump sum payment recipients may be rendered ineligible for
Medicaid if this payment is counted as income in the month of receipt. As Table 1
indicates, most states' threshold AFDC-related eligibility standards are low; a
lump sum payment intended to address an immediate need may, if not
disregarded, disqualify an applicant. Similarly, mandatory applicant job searches
could mean that many families find jobs quickly. As a result they may be
Medicaid-eligible for one or two months at most-or perhaps not at all if their
86 See id
87 See id
88 See OuTsTATIoNED MEDICAID ENROLLMENT PROGRAMS, supra note 76, at 6.
89 See infra Table 1.
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earnings exceed the "standards of need" shown in Table 1-and will immediately
lose their Medicaid coverage due to earned income. These families will also lose
the opportunity for transitional Medicaid assistance because they will not have
received Medicaid for three months prior to losing eligibility. This will also be
true for lump sum recipients.
The extent to which diverted families receive Medicaid will depend upon
several factors including whether states: (1) adequately inform families of their
right to apply for Medicaid even if they do not apply for or are not eligible for
cash assistance; (2) establish procedures to assure that applications for Medicaid
are accepted and processed even if an individual cannot apply for TANF or does
not meet all of the requirements to be eligible for TANF benefits; and (3) exercise
their section 1931 liberalization options and revise their AFDC criteria to conform
to the needs of applicants with either earned or lump sum income.
4. Section 1931 Optionsfor Ameliorating Impact ofDiversion
As discussed in Part I, section 1931 provides states with a series of options
for ameliorating the effects of diversion. States can exercise these options to
establish less restrictive standards and methodologies for determining Medicaid
eligibility for diverted families who otherwise might be rendered ineligible. For
example, families participating in lump sum payment diversion instead of
enrolling in TANF may become ineligible for Medicaid upon receipt of a lump
sum payment, which can be as much as the equivalent of three months of TANF
benefits. Using its section 1931 option, a state may specifically disregard the lump
sum payment in determining Medicaid eligibility.
Similarly, mandatory applicant job searches will likely mean that many
families get jobs quickly, perhaps before applying for or enrolling in TANF, or
probably within a month or two of enrolling. Consequently, families required to
find work quickly may be eligible for Medicaid for one or two months at most or
not at all if their incomes exceed the standards shown in Table 1. Moreover,
because of their shortened period of Medicaid enrollment, families could lose
their opportunity to receive an additional six to twelve months of transitional
Medicaid assistance because they failed to be enrolled for three out of the six
months preceding their loss of welfare. Again, using the less restrictive
methodologies option, states can choose to disregard entirely the first three
months of earned income for Medicaid eligibility purposes. This approach would
help working families both initially qualify for and retain Medicaid eligibility for
a sufficient period of time to trigger transitional Medicaid assistance.
In sum, if diversion programs continue to grow in number and are successful
in diverting families from cash assistance, then a growing number of eligible
families may effectively lose the opportunity to enroll in Medicaid. Furthermore,
if AFDC-related Medicaid standards are not altered, then working families could
be disqualified from any aid. States can avoid both results by altering their
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application procedures and by exercising their section 1931 authority to help
liberalize Medicaid eligibility criteria. Making these changes, however, requires
that state officials be aware of the potential effects of diversion programs on
access to Medicaid and understand the potential value of section 1931 to
ameliorate these effects. The second phase of our study was to determine the
extent to which state Medicaid agencies in states with diversion programs were
using their legal authority to address these issues.
B. Methodology
For the Medicaid phase of the diversion study, we used a nationwide point-
in-time descriptive research methodology. We contacted all thirty-one states
previously identified as offering diversion programs and requested their
participation in a structured telephone survey. We asked states to designate an
official who is familiar with Medicaid eligibility policy issues for participation in
the survey. In the five states selected for additional site visits,90 we collected
information in person and by telephone. We conducted the interviews with state
officials over a six-month period, from June through November 1998. Of the
thirty-one states operating a formal diversion program, twenty-nine participated
fully in the survey.91
We designed a survey with nine open-ended questions to collect information
about states' Medicaid policy decisions and implementation of their diversion
programs. Our survey was designed to address several basic areas: how states
implemented section 1931; whether and how they addressed Medicaid eligibility
issues raised by their diversion programs; the extent of coordination between state
human services officials and state Medicaid officials regarding Medicaid
eligibility policies; states' Medicaid outreach and education efforts; and the
degree of emphasis placed on providing health insurance to working poor adults.
Analyses and findings are based on discussions with state officials familiar
with current state Medicaid policies, review of section 1931 state plan
amendments (SPA) for twenty-five states, review of relevant HCFA documents
and guidance, and analysis of additional data collected as part of the project
It became evident to us that reliance on any one source of data would be
insufficient. For example, HCFA has issued several letters to state Medicaid
directors about how to interpret their authority and options under section 1931.92
90 These states were Georgia, Maryland, Missouri, Montana, and Ohio.
91 Project staff were unable to schedule an interview with Oklahoma officials during the
six-month study period. An Idaho official responded to our questions in writing, but did not
participate in the telephone interview. Consequently, project staff collected only partial
information.
92 See Search of Health Care Financing Administration, Center for Medicaid and State
Operations Internet Information Site, (visited Nov. 23, 1999) <http'//www.hcfa.gov/medicaid!
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In accordance with one HCFA policy, states operating federal welfare reform
demonstrations that contained a Medicaid component at the time of the enactment
of the 1996 legislation were required to submit a section 1931 SPA describing the
extent to which their demonstration criteria would be incorporated into their
general, operational state Medicaid plans. HCFA officials indicated that states
which did not submit a section 1931 SPA were assumed to be operating their
Medicaid programs without section 1115 demonstration waivers and were simply
continuing their basic AFDC methodologies and standards in effect as of July 16,
1996. 3 We reviewed the SPAs submitted by twenty-five states in order to
evaluate the design of their section 1931 programs.
Although reviewing the section 1931 state plan amendments provided the
most direct evidence of the options that states took under section 1931, it became
evident from our conversations with state officials that gauging their
understanding of the practical effects of welfare reform was critical to evaluating
the design of their section 1931 programs. It also became evident that certain
states which had failed to properly submit their SPAs in fact understood the
effects of diversion on Medicaid coverage and adjusted their Medicaid policies
accordingly. For example, several states with lump sum payment diversion
programs disregarded lump sum payments in determining Medicaid eligibility,
even though the use of the disregard was not codified in their section 1931 SPAs.
C. Findings
1. Provisions of States' 1931 SPAs
Of the thirty-one states operating diversion programs, twenty-one states94
had, at the time of our study, received approval of their state plan amendments;
state plan amendments in eight states95 were under review. Three states96
reported that they had not submitted their state plan amendments. Table 4
presents detailed information about each state.
medicaid.htni> (search for records containing "MEDICAID INFORMATION (INCLUDING
BALANCED BUDGET ACT OF 1997) FILE" in I WANT TO SEARCH THE field and
"SECTION 1931" in I WANT TO SEARCH FOR field).
93 States for whom submission of SPA is mandatory are those states that were using
alternative standards and methodologies for their Medicaid programs as part of their welfare
demonstration waivers.
94 These states were Arizona, Arkansas, California, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas,
Kentucky, Minnesota, Missouri, Nevada, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Oregon, South Carolina, Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin.
95 These states were Alabama, Colorado, Indiana, Maine, Missouri, Montana, South
Dakota, and Utah.
96 These states were Maryland, Virginia, and West Virginia.
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2. Lump Sum Payment Diversion
Of twenty states using lump sum diversion, eleven states had approved
section 1931 state plan amendments. 97 Of these states, only Arkansas specifically
disregarded lump sum payments in its section 1931 state plan amendment. This
provision represents a policy change. Previously in Arkansas, lump sum
payments were counted as income in the month of receipt. Two other states-
Wisconsin and North Carolina-elected to disregard assistance received under
the state TANF plan. Wisconsin's policy was not limited to its Job Access Loan
program (which the state does not consider to be a diversion program), but
applied to any payment made to a client. North Carolina's draft amendment
excluded all cash assistance payments made under the state TANF plan. These
provisions may or may not have been intended to include lump sum diversion
payments.
In the other states, officials reported that lump sum payments did not count
toward Medicaid eligibility, despite the fact that their state Medicaid plan
amendments did not indicate that lump sum payments would be disregarded. For
example, Florida's state plan amendment did not specifically disregard the lump
sum payment; however, officials reported that persons who receive lump sum
payments must be TANF eligible and therefore Medicaid eligible. It was unclear
how Florida's section 1931 Medicaid eligibility criteria addressed the federal
AFDC-related requirement that lump sum income be counted entirely in the
month of receipt. Failure to overcome this AFDC-related rule by using the section
1931 "more liberal standards and methodologies" option would immediately
disqualify individuals from Medicaid, given the degree to which a lump sum
payment would exceed AFDC-related Medicaid eligibility standards for a family
of that size. Similarly, state officials in Iowa reported that lump sum payments
were disregarded for Medicaid eligibility purposes, but their state plans did not
indicate the inclusion of a disregard.
In the event that lump sum payments are not disregarded, states can take
certain steps to ameliorate the potential impact of counting these payments. For
example, in Minnesota, in which lump sum payments can be substantial (as much
as $2800), state officials reported that lump sum payments may be prorated and
treated as income in the month received and as an asset thereafter. Minnesota's
resource level was set at a relatively high level of $3000. Minnesota's section
1931 state plan amendment, however, did not include a provision describing this
approach.
97 These states were Arkansas, California, Florida, Iowa, Kentucky, Minnesota, North
Carolina, Ohio, Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin.
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Among the five states with state plan amendments under review,9 8
Colorado's, Maine's, and South Dakota's SPAs did not include provisions that
disregard lump sum payments. Colorado proposed to increase its resource limit
from $1000 to $2000. Such a change would protect families in the event that
lump sum payments are treated as a resource, but would not provide protection
against excess monthly income. Utah's draft state plan amendment specifically
deemed diversion participants as Medicaid eligible by disregarding all income
and resources for diversion participants during the diversion period. As such,
Utah's state plan amendment offered the most specific consideration of diverted
applicants in terms of their Medicaid eligibility.
Our research also suggested that certain states, specifically Utah and
Montana, allowed for more generous treatment of income only in the case of
those TANF applicants who also participated in a TANF diversion program. To
the extent that states draw distinctions between Medicaid applicants who
participate in diversion efforts and those who simply seek Medicaid, such
selectivity would be considered by HCFA to be a violation of Medicaid's
"comparability" law, which requires comparable treatment of all similarly
situated families. However, because state SPAs were either missing or
incomplete, it was not possible to know whether certain states were in fact
extending more liberal standards for Medicaid only for selected subeategories of
low income families with children.
In sum, most states appeared at the time of our study to have adjusted their
Medicaid policies to take lump sum payments into account. However, this
assertion frequently was oral, with no SPA to confirm it. Moreover, because
detailed state plan amendments were lacking, it was not possible to know whether
states were being selective in the categories of applicants for whom the more
liberal treatment rules applied.
3. Mandatory Applicant Job Search Diversion
Table 4, which presents Medicaid data for states with mandatory job search
requirements, shows that several states reported modification of earned income
disregards as part of their section 1931 SPAs.
Whether modifications related to applicant income limits in fact help working
applicants attain or maintain Medicaid eligibility depends upon several factors:
(1) the degree of generosity of the earned income disregards and the timing of
their application; (2) whether the disregards are available to applicants as well as
recipients;99 and (3) whether, as part of the application process, the state continues
98 These states were Colorado, Maine, Montana, South Dakota, and Utah.
99 States are allowed to distinguish between applicants and recipients only with respect to
the earned income disregards because the AFDC-related rules allowed AFDC applicants and
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to measure applicants' income against the upper income limits that previously
applied to applicants under the AFDC-related methodologies that are shown in
Table 1.
Of the sixteen states with mandatory applicant job search requirements,
twelve statesi °° had approved section 1931 state plan amendments. Three
states101 had amendments under review at the time of our study, and one state102
had not submitted its state plan amendment, but had put more liberal
methodologies into place as part of its welfare reform demonstration programs.
Table 4 indicates that six states103 reported modifying their state plan
amendments to liberalize their existing AFDC earned income methodologies
under section 1931. In only three states104 did the more generous earned income
disregards appear to be available to applicants as well as recipients. Nevada
appeared to offer the most generous earned income disregards, having replaced its
standard AFDC earned income disregard with a disregard of all applicant earned
income for three months, followed by a fifty percent disregard of gross earnings
for the next nine months, and $90 or twenty percent of gross earnings (whichever
is greater) for all months thereafter.
While the language in the state's 1931 SPA seems to indicate that this
disregard is available only to individuals who were recipients of Medicaid in the
immediately preceding month, discussions with state officials confirmed that this
disregard was made available to applicants as well. At the same time, Nevada
limited this new earned income disregard to applicants whose monthly earnings
fell below a threshold earnings test of $817 for a family of three. This upper limit
on earned income was less than the threshold upper limits in place under the
AFDC-related methodologies. 10 5
Arizona, while not as generous with its earned income disregards as Nevada,
did make these disregards available to both applicants and recipients on an equal
basis. Consequently, families with incomes up to fifty-one percent of the federal
poverty level can qualify for Medicaid. Similarly, Oregon reported replacing its
AFDC earnings disregards for recipients with a more generous disregard that is
available to both applicants and recipients. Other states also reported expanding
disregards for applicants as well as recipients.
recipients to be treated differently (the $90 or $30 and one-third of income disregard was
available only for AFDC recipients).
100 These states were Arizona, Arkansas, Georgia, Idaho, Kansas, Nevada, New York,
Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, and Wisconsin.
10 1 These states were Alabama, Indiana, and Missouri.
102 This state was Maryland.
103 These states were Arizona, Arkansas, Kansas, Nevada, New York, and Oregon.
104 These states were Arizona, Nevada, and Oregon.
105 See infra Table 1.
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Despite the fact that a number of states reported altering their earnings
disregards to aid applicants, the disregards were relatively restricted and created
only limited additional eligibility. Furthermore, state responses to earned income
disregard policy for Medicaid purposes show considerable variation. Table 4
illustrates the consequences of different earnings disregards for applicants and
recipients in states with a mandatory applicant job search. In Kansas, applicant
families with incomes up to forty-three percent of the federal poverty level can
qualify for Medicaid, whereas recipient families with incomes up to sixty-seven
percent of the FPL can qualify for medical assistance. Similarly, Arkansas policy
provides twenty-two percent of the FPL for applicants and fifty-six percent for
recipients. In New York, this difference is even more striking-fifly-one percent
of the FPL for applicants and ninety-four percent of the FPL for recipients. In
both cases (applicants and recipients), the treatment of earnings for Medicaid
purposes is extremely limited. Despite the fact that the limitations are evident
across the board, of particular concern is the failure on the part of states to make
initial entry into the program possible for low income workers through their
maintenance of extraordinarily limited earned income disregards.
As noted, the AFDC-related criteria include a threshold upper-income limit
on the amount of income that applicants can have and still be permitted to apply
for benefits. As also discussed, this limited upper income threshold is
compounded by lower thresholds on the amount of income that applicants can
maintain and still qualify for any aid under state AFDC eligibility policies. Thus,
two important additional questions are first, whether states adjust the upper
income limit for applicants who work, in order to allow them to move forward
with an application at all, and second, whether the states adjust their net income
tests to allow applicants to retain earned income and still qualify for Medicaid.
Our findings suggest that few states addressed this "gross income" and "net
income" threshold eligibility test and that those that did often addressed only one
aspect of the test. As Table 4 shows, Arkansas, for example, has eliminated the
gross income test for applicants. At the same time, the state's net income standard
for a family of three (the standard below which an applicant's income actually
must fall in order to qualify for Medicaid) is twenty-two percent of the federal
poverty level. 10 6 A family earning the minimum wage (which is significantly
below the federal poverty level) would have income approximately four times the
net income test used by Arkansas to determine Medicaid eligibility, since the net
income test stands at twenty-two percent of the federal poverty level.
106 See infra Table 1.
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4. Outreach and Enrollment Under Section 1931
As discussed, how states actually administer their TANF and Medicaid
programs is as important as the section 1931 eligibility criteria established by the
states in determining families' ability to access Medicaid. This is particularly true
for families participating in diversion programs that add yet another layer of
complexity to ensuring access to, and determining eligibility for, Medicaid. Two
fundamental factors can affect access: (1) whether individuals understand that
they are eligible for Medicaid independent of their eligibility for TANF; and (2)
the extent to which eligibility procedures and safeguards are in place to ensure
that Medicaid applications are processed irrespective of the status of the TANF
applications.
The interview findings from our study suggest that as of 1998, few states
were making concerted efforts at outreach and education to ensure that low
income parents understood that they (and not just their children) might be eligible
for Medicaid without being eligible for (or even eligible to apply for) TANF. The
central evidence of the failure on the part of states to encourage applications for
Medicaid even as eligibility for TANF precludes the continued state practice of
joint TANF-Medicaid applications. This effectively means that an application
does not go forward unless an individual is applying for both programs. For
example, while Colorado policy is that individuals who apply for diversion also
complete a Medicaid application, a Colorado official noted that clients who sign
the agreement assume that they are not eligible for Medicaid. Moreover, the
Colorado official conceded that assuring the Medicaid application is completed
for diverted applicants is a "problem area."
On the other hand, Wisconsin officials reported developing an extensive
training effort for county staff, eligibility staff, and community-based
organizations. In addition, Wisconsin hired an advertising agency to develop
brochures, public service announcements for radio and television, and posters to
"get the word out" about Medicaid. Wisconsin officials also mentioned an earlier
failed effort to inform clients whose Medicaid case was closed that they still may
be eligible for Medicaid. The state issued a mass mailing to seventeen thousand
persons but it resulted in a considerable amount of mail returned undeliverable.
V. CONCLUSION: MEDICAID IN A CHANGING WELFARE SYSTEM
The 1996 welfare reform legislation fundamentally altered welfare, and in the
process of doing so, fundamentally altered Medicaid as well. The Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act empowered the states to
replace the old welfare-to-work paradigm with one that turns on work-instead-of-
welfare. Our analysis of diversion suggests that states have responded to this
flexibility with enthusiasm and that the dramatic declines in welfare rolls can be
1468 [Vol. 60:1443
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attributed less to sudden prosperity among the poor and more to the creation of
elaborate barriers to assistance.
Even as lawmakers moved with enthusiasm to "end welfare as we know
it,'1' 7 the evidence from the 1996 legislation suggests that they understood that
even full-time work would not negate the need for public insurance. The statistics
on health insurance coverage among the working poor were abysmal in 1996 and
have improved only slightly since then.108 As a result, lawmakers rejected the
block granting of Medicaid and instead elected to preserve the program as an
individual entitlement subject to minimum federal coverage standards. 10 9
Unfortunately, however, the standards that they chose to preserve were precisely
the wrong ones.
The obvious question is how did such a basic mistake occur? An exceedingly
poor understanding of Medicaid lies at the heart of the error. This limited grasp of
the nation's largest public assistance program was compounded by the haste with
which lawmakers acted in passing welfare reform and the virtual absence of
careful analysis regarding the potential effects of certain policy choices. In their
haste to preserve Medicaid in the face of the repeal of AFDC, lawmakers made an
obvious choice--namely to preserve the existing AFDC-related rules for
Medicaid. This choice turned out to be fundamentally wrong.
As this Article shows, the reasons why this was the wrong choice are very
complex. The first reason concerns the working assumptions that lie at the heart
of the AFDC methodology. AFDC is driven by income evaluation methodologies
that are tied to welfare-to-work principles. When applied in a work-instead-of-
welfare context, these methodologies turn out to punish the people who are being
taught to play by different rules. A mother of three who comes to a welfare office
and is told that she must find a job before she can apply for aid, who then finds a
job that pays $500 a month, and who finally returns to file her TANF and
Medicaid application, may find that the response that qualifies her for TANF now
costs her Medicaid coverage because the Medicaid program has not adjusted its
AFDC-related rules to take the world of work and earned income into account.
The second reason why the choice was wrong is tied to the administration of
the program. Once families know that they cannot obtain aid from the welfare
office until they find work and demonstrate self sufficiency, they simply may
cease to seek aid. At this point, the basic means of entering Medicaid will
potentially come to a halt, particularly if the Medicaid application remains
wedded to the TANF application.
Medicaid was designed to piggyback on a "welfare-to-work" system of cash
107 Address Before a Joint Session of Congress on Administration Goals, IPUB. PAPERS
113, 117 (Feb. 17,1993).
10 8 See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
109 See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
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assistance. In changing the assistance system, Congress and the Administration
simply neglected to change Medicaid and, indeed, locked the program into a
repealed welfare methodological basis and mode of administration. Simply put,
Medicaid as currently configured is basically incompatible with the new welfare
system that is intended to produce workers, not recipients.
The net result of this basic error in policy is that a program which insures a
quarter of the nation's children and millions of women has neither a
methodological nor operational base in coverage of the working poor. The 1997
enactment of the State Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP)110 may
mitigate the problem somewhat, at least in the case of children. This is because
states that enroll children in CHIP must first assess their Medicaid eligibility and
enroll them in Medicaid if they qualify. Furthermore, there is some evidence to
suggest that CHIP has stimulated a greater level of program outreach as well as a
simplification of eligibility criteria and application forms.
The real crisis at the moment is the uninsured low income parents of
Medicaid and CHIP-eligible children and, in particular, single mothers who at one
time qualified for AFDC and Medicaid and who are now caught between the
"scylla" of the TANF work-instead-of-welfare paradigm and the "charybdis" of a
Medicaid program that remains structured to reject low income workers who seek
benefits.
Thus, there is an urgent need to restructure the income evaluation
methodologies and application procedures on which the Medicaid program rests
in order to favor low income workers. A number of states have now begun to
engage in fundamental reassessment efforts. A few, most notably Oregon,
Tennessee, and Massachusetts, have experimented since the early 1990s with
demonstration programs that replace Medicaid as a welfare adjunct with a
program of health insurance for low income workers. States could be further
encouraged in this direction through enhanced federal financial contributions to
the creation of public insurance programs for lower income workers and their
families under section 1931 of the Social Security Act. Alternatively, of course,
Congress could decide to simply require this basic restructuring or replace the
existing Medicaid structure with a federalized program of subsidized health
insurance for low income families.
What is clear is that profound shifts in national policy such as those which
occurred under the 1996 welfare reform legislation have consequences that go far
beyond the reform effort's immediately stated goals. The welfare reform
legislation was enacted in haste and in a superheated political atmosphere, when
reasonable discourse was minimal and maneuvering for political gains at the
110 See Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, 111 Stat. 251, 552-75 (1997)
(codified at scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. ).
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expense of the poor was both accepted and indeed lauded.1 1 The unforeseen
consequences to Medicaid should serve as an object lesson regarding why such an
approach to legislation is such a terrible thing. None of the implications were
considered. The Congressional Budget Office did not even begin to understand
the consequences for Medicaid, as its own completely incorrect cost estimates
underscored. 112 Policy makers were not briefed on the intricate relationship
between Medicaid and welfare, and approaches for avoiding the impact of
Medicaid were not debated 1 3 Potentially useful handles for liberalizing the
Medicaid program to reach low income workers and their children were added to
the statute, 1 4 but the old welfare paradigm was preserved as the basic rule for
coverage.
One can only hope that as policy makers begin to confront the consequences
of welfare reform for Medicaid, they will show a willingness to engage in the
thoughtful dialogue regarding the program's future that should have occurred
years ago.
S11 See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
1 12 See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
1 13 See supra notes 3-6 and accompanying text.
1 14 See supra notes 67-70 and accompanying text.
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TABLES
Table 1. Maximum Allowable Monthly Earnings for Working
Medicaid Recipients (1997)
(Based on a three-person family with one wage earner.
Assumes that the family's only source of income is earnings.)
Earnings Earnings
Monthly Threshold Monthly Threshold
State.. Earnings as a % of State Earnings as a % of
Threshold the Fed. (continued) Threshold the Fed.
Poverty Povery
Level Level
Alabama $253 22% Montana $833 73%
Alaska $1,181 83% Nebraska $490 43%
Arizona $584 51% Nevada $1,020 900/
Arkansas $255 22% New Hampshire $686 600/
California $864 76% New Jersey $533 47%
Colorado $510 45% New Mexico $702 62%
Connecticut $866 76% New York $666 59%
Delaware $1,228 108% North Carolina $634 56%
District of Columbia $2,275 200% North Dakota $845 74%
Florida $392 34% Ohio $972 85%
Georgia $513 45% Oldahoma $426 37%,/
Hawaii $1,309 100%,0 Oregon $1,138 100%,0
Idaho $406 36% Pennsylvania $804 71%
Illinois $597 52% Rhode Island $2.194 193%
Indiana $377 33% South Carolina $658 583/o
Iowa $1,063 93% South Dakota $796 70D/o
Kansas $493 43% Tennessee $766 67%
Kentucky $615 54% Texas $364 32%
Louisiana $263 23% Utah $657 58%
Maine $1.227 108% Vermont $1,797 158%
Maryland $523 46% Virginia $380 33%
Massachusetts $1,513 133% Washington $1,090 96%
Michigan $548 48% West Virginia $342 30%
Minnesota $3,128 275% Wisconsin $737 65%
Mississippi $457 40%/a Wyoming $789 69%,/
Missouri $381 33%
Median State $666 590,0
Source: JOCELYNGUYER& CINDYMANN, CTIL ON BUDGEr&POL'Y PRIORItIES, EMPLOYED BUTNOT
INSURED (1999), at tbl.3.
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Table 2. Dynamics of Medicaid Access Prior to and Following the 1996 Welfare
Reform Amendments
Immediate enrollment of all
eligible families in cash assistance;
families automatically eligible for
Medicaid
Diversion of many eligible families through lump
sum payments and job searches; Medicaid
eligibility thrown into question as lump sum and
earned income push applicants' income above 1996
AFDC eligibility levels.
Period of cash assistance (typically Period of cash assistance (if any) very short - often
between 6 and 12 months) less than 3 months; accompanying Medicaid
accompanied by Medicaid. coverage similarly may be limited to less than 3
months.
Transition from welfare to work; Transitional Medicaid is available but fewer
transitional Medicaid for families families qualify for failure to meet the 3/6 test.
receiving welfare/Medicaid in 3 of
6 months preceding loss of welfare
1999] 1473
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Table 3. Categories of State Diversion Programs
State .Lump Sum Alternative Resources Job Search
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona "
Arkansas V V
California V
Colorado V
Connecticut
Delaware
District of Columbia
Florida V "
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho V "
Illinois
Indiana V
Iowa V
Kansas
Kentucky V
Louisiana
Maine V
Maryland - V V
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota V
mississp
Missouri V
Montana V V
Nebraska
Nevada V
NewHampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
NewYork V "
North Carolina V
North Dakota
Ohio V"
Oklahoma V
Oregon "
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina V
South Dakota V
Tennessee
Texas V V
Utah V
Vermont
Virginia V
Washington V
West Virginia V
Wisconsin Vv V
Wyoming
ITotal 20 7
Source: K Maloy et. al, A Description and Assessment of State Approaches to Diversion Programs and Activities
Under Welfare Reform (rable 1-1)
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